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Foreword
In the run up to the general election (6 May 
2010), with all political parties struggling to 
devise ways of reducing public expenditure, 
there has been little comment about one 
way in which major savings can be achieved 
- and painlessly. There is now the potential 
for real savings, rather than just rhetorical 
ones, from reducing losses to fraud.  
This Report outlines 
What the real losses are•	
How much they can be reduced by•	
How quickly•	
Where the savings can be made  •	
What needs to be done.•	
Fraud losses affect the public sector in 
many areas, depriving UK citizens of 
the extent and quality of public services 
which they have paid their taxes in order 
to receive. They occur in expenditure on 
payroll, procurement, benefits, public 
housing, healthcare and education, and 
also result in lost income across local 
and national taxation. Fraudsters include 
staff and managers, contractors and 
citizens. A dishonest minority affects 
all public sector organisations of any 
size and the greatest financial costs 
are incurred from high volume, low 
value fraud, rather than vice versa. 
Historically, the cost of such fraud 
has not been reliably quantifiable. 
And if you can’t measure a cost, how 
can you possibly plan to reduce it, or 
prove any subsequent reduction? 
However, the last decade has seen the 
development of accurate (+or- 1%) and 
statistically valid (95% statistical confidence) 
measurement methodologies for treating 
fraud (and error) losses like any other 
business cost. These methodologies 
represent a quantum leap forward in 
estimating the financial cost of fraud.
The picture shown by the latest global 
data is unequivocal. Two thirds of the 
exercises show losses of between 3 and 
9%, with an average percentage loss of 
4.57% generally and 5.59% in respect of 
healthcare expenditure. The nature of the 
base data for these figures makes them 
highly credible. They are referred to in this 
Report as the ‘global survey percentages’.
What has also been discovered is that 
the most effective way of reducing 
losses is in fact to change the culture – 
mobilising the honest majority of people, 
incentivising them with the clear financial 
benefits that flow from good practice, 
and creating strong peer group pressure 
against fraud. Knowing how much you 
are losing is key to this process. By 
combining that pressure to do ‘the right 
thing’ with information targeted at the 
dishonest minority about the real risks 
of detection, investigation and sanctions, 
it is possible to deter – and significantly 
reduce – the dishonest minority.
This new approach may come as a shock 
to those brought up on a diet of cops 
and robbers TV shows such as ‘The 
Sweeney’, or more recently, ‘Ashes to 
Ashes’, but we now have the means to 
make savings real, tangible and provable. 
Furthermore, the news from around 
the world is that the scale of existing 
losses makes work to reduce them highly 
beneficial. Between 1998 and 2006 I 
was CEO of the Counter Fraud Service 
in the much criticised NHS, one of the 
largest areas of UK public expenditure. 
We achieved a reduction of losses by up 
to 40% within 15 months and up to 60% 
over 8 years. This delivered over £800 
million in financial benefits at a return 
of 12 : 1 on the costs of the work.
The statistics are dramatic. Applying the 
global survey percentages to UK public 
expenditure - after taking account of 
areas of expenditure where accurate 
loss measurement has already been 
progressed - would indicate losses to 
expenditure of £22.4 billion. Official 
estimates of losses to revenue from 
taxation add £16.1 billion to this figure, 
making total losses of over £38 billion.
Excluding expenditure by the Department 
of Work and Pensions on benefits, for 
reasons described later in this Report, then 
a rate of loss reduction comparable with 
the average achieved elsewhere, would 
over the course of three years be delivering 
recurring financial benefits of more than 
£11 billion a year. This would be a real step 
forwards in closing the UK’s existing budget 
deficit and reducing public expenditure 
as painlessly and effectively as possible.
Jim Gee,
Director of Counter Fraud Services, 
MacIntyre Hudson LLP
Chair of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies, University of Portsmouth
Follow Jim on Twitter 
http://twitter.com/MHFraud
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“We now have the means to make savings real, tangible 
and provable.”
lntroduction
This Report applies the most accurate 
figures which are available to estimate 
the financial cost of fraud in UK public 
expenditure and taxation revenue, losses 
occured in respect of ungathered tax 
revenue at both national and local levels.
These figures have 
Where organisations (like the Department 
of Work and Pensions) have undertaken 
their own accurate and statistically valid 
measurement exercises, the figures derived 
from this work have been accepted as the best 
available. Where this has not happened (as in 
most cases) the Report has applied the ‘global 
survey percentages’. These percentages 
are the result of the most extensive global 
research ever undertaken into the financial 
cost of fraud and error in public expenditure 
- ‘The Financial Cost of Fraud Report’1 
published in late 2009 and ‘The Financial Cost 
of Healthcare Fraud Report’2  published in 
January 2010. Where no figures derived from 
accurate and statistically valid measurement 
are available the Report has included 
prevailing official estimates.
The extensive Global Research, from which 
the global survey percentages were derived, 
was built on previously established knowledge 
from relevant measurement exercises. The 
data has then been analysed electronically. 
Exercises were collated from Europe, North 
America and Australia and New Zealand. None 
were found in Asia or Africa.
What the research shows
The volume and variety of the research, 
and the consistent picture which emerges 
no matter the type of public expenditure, 
organisation or country concerned, 
make the findings of an average 4.57% 
percentage loss rate, and 5.59% in respect 
of healthcare expenditure, highly credible. 
Of course no research can be perfect and 
a perfect estimate of losses is impossible - 
there is always more to be done. However, 
the Report consciously seeks to apply the 
best available figures with ‘best’ defined 
as those derived from accurate and 
statistically valid measurement of losses. 
The research also shows how quickly 
such losses can be reduced and by how 
much (which is discussed on page 14).
Finally, this Report makes a number 
of recommendations drawn from best 
practice implemented in cases where 
losses were successfully reduced, to point 
the way to achieving equivalent gains 
in respect of UK public expenditure. 
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1 ‘The Financial Cost of Fraud Report’ published by MacIntyre Hudson LLP and the 
Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at University of Portsmouth in November 2009
2 ‘The Financial Cost of Healthcare Fraud Report’ published by MacIntyre Hudson LLP 
and the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at University of Portsmouth in January 2010
 
Unhelpfully, fraud is often 
viewed as a purely criminal 
matter - something for the 
police to investigate and the 
courts to penalise; something 
which is ‘perpetrated’ by ‘bad 
people’ who are then punished. 
Equally unhelpfully, the solution 
is sometimes seen simply as 
improved adherence to ethical 
principles and higher moral 
standards. Why are these two 
views unhelpful? 
Criminal law
The criminal law deals with the individual 
fraudsters, where its’ higher standards of 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ proof allows 
it to. The Fraud Act 2006 introduced 
a new offence of fraud which can be 
committed in three ways: fraud by 
false representation, fraud by failing 
to disclose and fraud by abuse of a 
position of trust. Other new offences 
include possession of articles intended 
for use in fraud, making or supplying 
articles for use in fraud and fraudulent 
business carried out by a sole trader. 
Civil law
It is administrative procedures, backed 
up by the civil law which (mostly) help 
to recover the losses which are incurred. 
The concept of fraud in the civil law dates 
back to Derry v. Peek 1889 – this is where 
someone intentionally or recklessly obtains 
resources to which they are not entitled - 
with the standard of proof of the ‘balance 
of probability’ being applied. The losses 
which are subject to civil litigation represent 
the greatest damage – in the public sector 
depriving UK citizens of the quality or 
extent of public services which they have 
paid their taxes in order to receive. Viewing 
fraud as a purely criminal matter thus 
makes its greatest harm less visible.
Thinking beyond the law
Furthermore, while improved adherence 
to ethical principles and higher moral 
standards are clearly good things to 
happen, seeing this as the main solution to 
be pursued is a bit like trying to stop the 
tide coming in. There always will be ‘bad 
people’; the point is that they should not 
be given the opportunity to cause losses to 
fraud and the resulting damage. Ethical and 
moral appeals need to be complimented by 
the provision of factual information about 
the extent of losses and their effect on 
public services - the subject of this Report.
Finally, fraud can also be a disciplinary 
matter and a regulatory issue, either in 
addition to or where either criminal or civil 
legal action is not possible or appropriate. 
Removing an individual or an organisation 
from the context in which they have 
undertaken fraud, helps to deprive them 
of the opportunity to commit fraud.
A broader view of the law concerning fraud 
and the potential sanctions to be applied 
helps, but we need to think beyond the law. 
Once there is an accurate figure for the 
real extent of fraud losses then they can 
be treated like any other business cost – 
something to be reduced and minimised 
in the best interest of the financial health 
and stability of the organisation concerned. 
It becomes possible to go beyond reacting 
to unforeseen individual instances of 
fraud and to include plans to pre-empt 
and minimise fraud losses in business 
plans. Crucially, in the context of likely 
future reductions in public expenditure, 
it becomes possible to make these less 
painful than would otherwise be the case. 
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What is fraud?
“Unhelpfully, fraud is often viewed as a purely 
criminal matter - something for the police to 
investigate and the courts to penalise...”
The last full year for which 
actual public expenditure figures 
are available is 2008-2009. 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, analysing 
Government figures, calculated that total 
Central Government spending for the year 
was £618.6 billion3. To this we should 
add £30.768 billion raised in taxation and 
spent by Local Government4, providing 
a figure for total public expenditure of 
£649.4 billion. This total includes:
£135.7 billion spent by the •	
Department for Work and Pensions 
(including just under £129.9 billion 
paid out in benefits and pensions) 
£123 billion spent by Local •	
Government (£92.2 billion received in 
grants centrally with a further £30.8 
billion raised and spent locally)
£109.4 billion spent by the •	
Department of Health (including 
£94.5 billion spent on the NHS)
£34.9 billion spent by HM •	
Revenue and Customs on Tax 
Credits and Child Benefit.
This leaves £246.4 billion spent by the rest 
of Central Government, which includes 
£85.5 billion spent on maintaining 
financial stability and debt interest of 
£24.1 billion. Just under £136.8 billion was 
spent on other services and agencies.
3 ‘A Survey of Public Spending in the UK’ – 
Institute for Fiscal Studies – September 2009
4 ‘Analysis of Local Authority Budgets for 
2008-9’ – Department of Communities 
and Local Government
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The extent of public expenditure
Historically, the cost of fraud and 
error is not something which 
has been accurately measured. 
It is only over the last decade 
that this situation has changed.
Prior to the sort of accurate and statistically 
valid measurement which is now possible, 
a variety of techniques were used. Some 
still prevail but the situation is changing. 
Each of these is reviewed below.
Detected fraud
In some cases organisations simply added 
up the value of the losses found in cases of 
detected fraud and assumed that this figure 
represented the total losses incurred. This 
conveniently ignored the reality that for the 
figure to be accurate there would need to be 
a 100% successful detection rate, something 
that is not even the case for the offence 
of murder. For this reason, comparisons 
between accurately measured losses and 
figures for the value of detected fraud have 
shown a ratio of  up to 30 : 1, and thus 
figures calculated on the basis of detected 
fraud are likely to represent a significant 
underestimate of the true position.
‘Guesstimates’
In other cases organisations have relied 
on ‘guesstimates’ from leading individuals 
and / or surveys of opinion. These tend to 
vary significantly according to the perceived 
seriousness of the problem at the time by 
those surveyed and / or the extent to which 
their organisation has an appetite to do 
something about it. While they sometimes 
represent a valid survey of opinion, that is 
very different from a valid survey of losses.
HM Treasury figures 
HM Treasury publishes an annual document 
entitled ‘2008-2009 Fraud Report’5. This 
is described as ‘an analysis of reported 
fraud in government departments’. For 
2008-2009, it stated that the cost of 
fraud was £4.219 million or 0.026% of 
Government Department’s administrative 
expenditure,175 times less than the 
global survey percentages would indicate 
to be the case (as we shall see below). 
In a significantly understated manner, 
the Treasury states that this does ‘not 
necessarily’ represent ‘a complete picture’!
In reality, this report adds up the detected 
‘internal’ fraud involving those working 
for Government Department’s, and does 
not include any other types of fraud.
Audit Commission figures
The Audit Commission regulates the 
proper control of public finances by 
local authorities and the National Health 
Service in England. Audit Wales, Audit 
Scotland and the Northern Ireland 
Audit Office perform similar functions 
for their respective countries. 
The Audit Commission has supplied 
information to the National Fraud Authority 
(NFA) concerning fraud losses in local 
government. It surveyed 24 London local 
authorities about the detected fraud losses 
and the NFA then extrapolated these 
figures and added some figures from 
Audit Scotland. The Audit Commission 
also provided some figures for housing 
tenancy fraud – 50,000 properties are 
estimated to be unlawfully occupied – and 
for single person discount council tax 
fraud. In respect of the latter, the Audit 
Commission estimates ‘conservatively’ 
that 4% of council tax revenue is 
not collected because of fraud.
The Audit Commission should be 
congratulated for the first ever attempts 
to assess losses in these areas. 
However, none of these estimates are 
based on statistically valid, survey 
based, loss measurement exercises.
NFA estimates
The National Fraud Authority (NFA) 
estimates that public sector fraud 
cost £17.6 billion6 in its Annual Fraud 
Indicator published in January 2010. 
This figure is derived from an exercise 
which asked constituent parts of the 
public sector (or those auditing them) 
for their views on the extent of losses. 
They are to be congratulated for collating 
this information for the first time – a 
difficult task. However, there are intrinsic 
problems associated with asking parts 
of the public sector to estimate their 
own losses. First, losses for some parts 
of the public sector have not been 
included because they simply have not 
provided the NFA with the information 
that it sought. By undertaking the survey 
in this way it was inevitable that this 
would be the case and therefore that 
the estimate would be incomplete. 
Secondly, the ‘methodologies’ (to the 
extent to which they exist) which have been 
applied to provide losses estimates vary 
significantly – from accurate and statistically 
valid measurement by the DWP to obvious 
‘guesstimates’ elsewhere. In particular, 
an interesting feature is that unmeasured 
estimates of losses resulting from the 
behaviour of people as citizens (for example 
evading taxation) are consistently higher 
than similarly unmeasured estimates of 
losses resulting from the behaviour of 
public sector employees (for example HM 
Treasury estimates of losses to internal 
fraud by Government employees). Accurate 
measurement of both types of losses would, 
of course, provide objective information. 
However, in the absence of this, it might 
appear that the scale of the estimates 
reflects the different levels of potential 
embarrassment that might be caused.
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Measuring the cost
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The Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP):
DWP provided estimates of losses to 
fraud involving the benefits which they 
administer. They estimate for 2008-
2009 that £1.1 billion (or 0.8% of total 
expenditure) was lost to fraud. This is a 
low figure, but one which, for the most 
part, is based on statistically valid and 
accurate loss measurement exercises 
– something which the DWP should be 
congratulated for undertaking. The low 
figure may reflect the length of time that 
DWP have been tackling this problem. 
Local government:
Based on the Audit Commission’s work 
(see above) the NFA estimates that £684 
million is lost to fraud in local government 
or equivalent to 0.56% of local government 
expenditure for 2008-2009 – more 
than eight times less than the global 
average loss figures would indicate to 
be the case (as we shall see below).
The NHS:
The NHS and its audit organisations in 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland have provided the NFA with 
information indicating that only £263 
million is lost to fraud. The exact origins of 
this figure are not clear in the NFA’s ‘Annual 
Fraud Indicator’. Given the published 
percentage loss levels in several different 
areas of NHS expenditure in England 
and Wales – as a result of statistically 
valid and accurate loss measurement 
exercises – it would be a great surprise if 
this figure was correct. It represents 0.28% 
of expenditure for 2008-2009 – almost 
20 times less than the global average 
loss figures for healthcare would indicate 
to be the case (as we shall see below).
Central Government:  
In respect of central Government, the 
NFA’s ‘Annual Fraud Indicator’, published 
in January 2010, comments that ‘few areas 
of central Government spending have been 
reviewed to quantify known and unknown 
losses’. As a result, its estimate of £356 
million losses, is based on the HM Treasury 
figures for ‘internal’ fraud (see above) plus 
various figures for detected fraud provided 
by a small minority of Departments and 
agencies. If correct, it would represent 
less than 0.14% of central government 
spending – 31 times less than the global 
average loss figures would indicate to 
be the case (as we shall see below). 
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC): 
HMRC provided estimates of the size of 
the ‘tax gap’ by considering how much 
tax was actually collected compared 
with how much they believe should have 
been. They estimate the tax gap to be 
£40 billion for 2007-2008 and further 
estimate that 37.5% of this gap (or £15 
billion) is attributable to fraud-related 
behaviour – a 3% loss rate. HMRC also 
stated that losses to tax credit fraud were 
between £100-200 million out of £20 
billion during 2007-2008. As is particularly 
obvious in the latter case, these estimates 
are not based on statistically valid, survey 
based loss measurement exercises.
Pensions: 
The final main element of the NFA’s 
estimates concern pensions fraud. This 
figure, of £64 million, is taken from the 
fraud detected by the Audit Commission’s 
National Fraud Initiative (NFI) data matching 
exercise for 2008-2009. While the NFI is 
an effective fraud detection program, any 
figures derived from it cannot represent 
actual losses unless we assume the 
unlikely event of a 100% detection rate.
Global survey figures
‘The Financial Cost of Fraud Report’ 
and ‘The Financial Cost of Healthcare 
Fraud Report’ excluded any figures 
based on detected or reported fraud or 
‘guesstimates’ or surveys. Instead, the 
reports only considered loss measurement 
exercises where the work had been 
undertaken in a statistically valid (90 – 
95% statistical confidence) and accurate 
(plus or minus 1 – 2.5%) manner.
The reports documented an average 
overall percentage expenditure loss 
rate of 4.57% and a specific healthcare 
expenditure loss rate of 5.59%. 
The difference between previous 
‘guesstimates’ of fraud losses and the 
data from the statistically valid and 
accurate exercises applied in this Report 
is equivalent to the difference between 
navigation by the stars and navigation by 
satellite. Fraud can be measured like any 
other business cost and there is simply 
no need to rely on ‘guesstimates’, surveys 
and figures for detected fraud. These 
techniques underestimate the extent 
of fraud and thus also underestimate 
the potential benefits of reducing it.
In the next section of this Report we 
shall review what the global survey 
percentages show that the real losses to 
public expenditure fraud are likely to be.
5 ‘2008-2009 Fraud Report’– HM 
Treasury – December 2009
6 ‘Annual Fraud Indicator’ – National 
Fraud Authority – January 2010
It is common sense that the first 
step to solving a problem is to 
know what it is. Equally, with 
fraud it is impossible to apply 
the correct solution and reduce 
losses until you know the true 
nature and scale of the problem. 
Official estimates v research results
The table on page 11officially shows 
estimated losses for 2008-2009 
for key areas of public expenditure 
compared to levels of losses indicated 
by the global survey percentages.
2008-2009 is the last year for which 
there are finalised figures for public 
expenditure, which has clearly grown 
since then. For 2010-2011, it is therefore 
the case that losses will have grown as 
well. However, for the purposes of this 
Report, the authors have decided to adopt 
a conservative approach to the losses 
and make projections on the basis of 
2008-2009 expenditure and losses.
The difference between the figures 
based on the global survey percentages 
found across 132 exercises in 44 
organisations in 9 countries (including the 
UK), and the current officially estimated 
figures in the UK for losses, range 
from massive to highly significant.
If the current official estimates are to be 
accepted as correct then we should be 
clear that we are saying that we are up 
to 175 times better at protecting public 
expenditure against fraud than other 
countries - a somewhat difficult proposition.
The alternative proposition is that we are 
probably pretty much aligned to other 
countries – and losses in public expenditure 
are much greater than currently estimated.  
This could be a difficult thing to accept, 
especially for those running public 
sector organisations where there are 
great pressures not to admit that public 
funds go astray. However, the reality is 
that the first step to solving a problem 
is to stop being in denial about it.
If we accept for a moment that the 
UK is probably no worse or no better 
than most countries, then we are 
losing £22.407 billion in respect 
of public sector expenditure. 
In addition we need to consider losses 
to revenue from taxation. No accurate 
or statistically valid measurement 
exercises have yet taken place in this 
area and neither do the global survey 
percentages relate to it. Thus we fall 
back on the official estimates.
The National Fraud Authority’s (NFA) Annual 
Fraud Indicator, published in January 2010, 
reports HM Revenue and Customs’ estimate 
that £15 billion (or 3.5%) of centrally 
collected taxation income was lost in 2007-
2008 as a result of fraud-related behaviour. 
This estimate is applicable across different 
types of taxation and it is therefore 
reasonable in the absence of more accurate 
information to apply it more generally.
In 2008-2009, the main year which this 
Report focuses on, local authorities raised 
£30.768 billion in tax revenue. Applying 
the HMRC percentage estimate would mean 
that £1.07 billion of additional revenue 
went uncollected. Based on current official 
estimates, it may therefore be the case 
that over £16 billion of tax revenue was 
not collected as a result of fraud-related 
behaviour. This is a shocking figure.
Adding the losses across all expenditure 
and revenue together, we can calculate the 
most extensive estimate ever determined 
across public expenditure and revenue. 
By relying on the best quality estimates 
for the constituent losses and ensuring 
the application, to the greatest possible 
extent, of measured figures, we can also 
calculate the most accurate estimate. 
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Financial cost of public sector fraud
This Report believes that the 
financial cost of UK public sector 
fraud to be £38.477 billion.
The potential for savings, without the 
pain of cutting public services to the 
same extent, is highly significant.
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No. Area Officially 
estimated losses
Current percentage 
loss estimate
Surveyed global 
loss percentage
Likely actual 
losses 
Extent of current 
underestimate
1 DWP Pensions and 
Benefits Expenditure
£1.1 billion 0.8% (See footnote7) £1.10 billion -
2 Local Government 
Total Expenditure
£684 million 0.56% 4.57% £5.62 billion 1/8
3 NHS £263 million 0.28% 3% (See footnote8) 2.837 billion 1/10
4 (Remaining) Central 
Government 
Expenditure
£356 million 0.14% 4.57% £11.26 billion 1/31
5 Central Government 
Administrative 
Expenditure
£4.219 million 0.26% 4.57% (See footnote9) 1/175
6 HMRC Benefits 
And Tax Credits 
Expenditure
£100 - £200 
million 
0.5 - 1% (See 
footnote10)
4.57% £1.59 billion (See 
footnote11)
-
7 Central Government 
Taxation Revenue
£15 billion 3.5% 3.5% £15 billion -
8 Local Government 
Taxation Revenue 
- 3.5% 3.5% £1.07 billion -
9 Total £17.6 billion £38.477 billion 1/2
Officially estimated and likely actual losses 2008-2009
7 The Department of Work and Pensions have 
been measuring their losses accurately since 
the late 1990s and undertaking a range of 
work to reduce them over an even longer 
period. Given the derivation of their estimates, 
it is felt to be reasonable to accept them.
8 The NHS Counter Fraud Service has been 
measuring and reducing losses since 1998. The 
losses figure they have provided for the NFA’s 
2010 Annual Fraud Indicator (£263 million) 
does not relate to the percentage figures found 
in loss measurement exercises undertaken 
between 1998 and 2006. However, despite this 
being (probably) a considerable underestimate 
of the actual losses, it is reasonable, considering 
the NHS’s work in this area that losses are lower 
than the average found globally for healthcare 
fraud losses (5.59%). For the purposes of this 
Report, and to be conservative, the authors 
have felt it reasonable to assess them at 
the bottom of the range of what the global 
research shows for healthcare losses – 3%.
9 Included in the line above.
10 This is a Tax Credits only figure. HMRC spent 
£20billion on Tax Credits for 2007-2008.
11 This is a figure across all £34.9 billion 
HMRC Benefits and Tax Credits expenditure.
“If the current official estimates are to be accepted 
as correct then we should be clear that we are saying 
that we are up to 175 times better at protecting 
public expenditure against fraud than other 
countries - a somewhat difficult proposition.”
Work to measure losses can be 
highly cost-effective. The extent 
to which efforts to reduce losses 
are helped by greater knowledge 
about the problem is shown 
by the significantly lower (15%) 
average level of losses where 
they have been re-measured 
over a period of time12 . 
The research that lead to the publication 
of ‘The Financial Cost of Fraud Report’ 
quoted four representative examples 
where fraud losses have been reduced.  
Relevant examples
Where losses have been measured and the 
organisations concerned have accurate 
information about their nature and 
extent, there are examples, especially in 
the UK and U.S. where losses have been 
substantially reduced. These include:
The UK’s own National Health Service •	
(the second largest organisation in the 
world) where losses were reduced by 
up to 60% between 1998 and 2006 
and by up to 40% within 15 months13  
The U.S. Department for Education, •	
which reduced its losses across a 
$12 billion dollar grant program by 
35% between 2001 and 200514  
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, •	
which reduced its losses across 
a $12 billion dollar program by 
28% between 2002 and 200415   
The UK’s Department of Work and •	
Pensions which has successfully 
reduced its losses in Income Support 
and Job Seekers Allowance by 50% 
between 1997/98 and 2005/0616.   
Both this and previous Reports have shown 
that fraud losses can be measured. The 
examples above show that, once measured, 
they can be reduced - and rapidly.
The speed of the reductions shown in 
these examples averages over 10% a 
year with the UK’s NHS reducing their 
losses by up to 40% within 15 months. 
Reducing losses in UK public expenditure
Applying this data to determine the 
extent of a future possible reduction in 
losses in UK public expenditure is not 
straightforward. If we are conservative 
and assume that, in the current economic 
context, there would be a national 
government focus on such reductions – to 
avoid cutting public services unnecessarily 
– it is reasonable to assume that progress 
would be better than the average. However, 
what was achieved in the NHS, one part 
of the public sector, would be unlikely to 
be replicated across the public sector as 
a whole – at least not as quickly. Losses 
would also be recurring and overall 
expenditure might grow over time. 
The time period to consider this question 
has been taken as three years. A substantial 
commitment is needed to help reduce 
the public sector deficit well within the 
Government’s commitment to reduce 
it by half over four years. Over that 
three year period, the level of reduction 
which has been chosen to exemplify 
what could be achieved, is 30%. This 
reflects the average speed of reduction 
of other organisations internationally.
What might be achieved by such a 
reduction is indicated in the table below.
Let us be clear. This would mean that 
£11.213 billion less would be lost to fraud 
and error each year from 2013 – 2014, and 
that is a conservative figure because it is 
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How much can losses be reduced by?
“Where losses have been measured and the organisations 
concerned have accurate information about their nature 
and extent, there are examples, especially in the UK and 
U.S. where losses have been substantially reduced.”
No. Area Losses Savings based on a 30% 
reduction over 3 years
1 DWP Pensions and Benefits 
Expenditure
£1.1 billion Not included - see page 11, 
footnote 7
2 Local Government Total 
Expenditure 
£5.62 billion £1.686 billion
3 NHS £2.837 billion £851 million
4 (Remaining) Central 
Government Expenditure 17 
£11.26 billion £3.378 billion
5 Central Government 
Administrative Expenditure
£741 million 18 £222 million 19
6 HMRC Benefits and Tax 
Credits Expenditure 
£1.59 million £477 million
7 Central Government 
Taxation Revenue
£15 billion £4.5 billion 
8 Local Government Taxation 
Revenue
£1.07 billion £321 million
9 Total £38.477 billion £11.213 billion
Prospective annual savings in public expenditure by 2013-2014
based on expenditure and revenue losses 
for 2008-2009. Uprated to take account of 
2010-2011 levels of expenditure, this figure 
is likely to be in the order of £12 billion.
The cumulative savings would, of course, 
be much greater - £3.737 billion (Year 1) 
/ £7.474 billion (Year 2) / £11.213 billion 
(Year 3) – a total of £22.424 billion. Again 
this is a conservative figure because, like 
the figure for annual savings, it is based on 
expenditure and losses for 2008-2009.
There will be those who deny that these 
savings can be made. They will be 
motivated by several factors – among 
these will be the fear of admitting the 
losses in the first place and the fear of 
failing to achieve the savings which are 
possible. The next section of this Report 
shows how the savings can be achieved.
12 The Financial Cost of Fraud Report’ 2009.
13 UK NHS Counter Fraud and Security 
Management Service – 1999 to 
2006 Performance Statistics
14 U.S. Department of Education Performance 
and Accountability Reports 2001 – 2005 
15 U.S. Department of Agriculture Performance 
and Accountability Reports 2002 - 2004. 
16 UK Department of Work and Pensions 
– Fraud and Error in the Benefits 
System – April 2005 to March 2006
17 Excluding HMRC Tax Credits 
and Benefits expenditure
18 Stated for illustrative purposes only - 
included in losses under line 4 of the table
19 Stated for illustrative purposes only - 
included in savings under line 4 of the table
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As the previous section of this 
Report shows, the ‘size of the 
prize’ to be delivered from 
reducing existing fraud losses 
is very significant. This is true 
both in purely financial terms 
and in terms of smaller cuts 
in services being needed.
A proactive Government approach
Historically, the approach of most of 
the UK public sector to fraud has been 
reactive, detecting fraud once it is taking 
place and responding with investigations 
which potentially lead to the application 
of sanctions. This approach does not 
address the financial losses which 
fraud causes, for several reasons. 
The extent to which fraud losses are 
detected is usually low – estimates vary 
but as little as 1/30 of the measured 
cost of fraud has been detected, even 
in organisations which have spent 
time and resources on the effort20.
It is high volume, low value fraud which 
is usually found to represent the greatest 
financial cost, rather than the large, high 
value cases which hit the headlines21 (for 
the very reason that they are rare), and 
the visibility of this type of fraud is low.
The specific nature of fraud also makes it 
hard to detect. It is a form of undesirable 
behaviour that is based on deception, 
disguise and the careful hiding of relevant 
facts. However, there is not a single 
criminal offence with a 100% detection 
rate – even murder – so the approach of 
mainly seeking to detect and react to such 
problems is, in the view of the authors 
of this Report, intrinsically flawed. 
Another obvious reason why a reactive 
approach is not helpful is because the 
losses have already been incurred by 
the time action is taken. Some individual 
fraudsters may be pursued and punished 
but, if the opportunity for fraud exists, 
then there will always be others who will 
continue to drain the public finances.
In contrast, the last decade has seen the 
development (in the UK and beyond22) 
of a more comprehensive approach, 
with the clear goal of pre-empting fraud 
and losses. Examples of the success 
of this approach have been cited in 
the previous section of this Report.
It is also the case that, until very recently, 
with the Government’s Fraud Review Report 
of 2007, and the creation of the National 
Fraud Authority (NFA), there hasn’t been 
any coherent, cross-government, cross-
economy approach. This initiative is still 
very young. Despite the hard work 
of its staff, the NFA is under-resourced, 
attached to one of the smallest Government 
departments23, tasked with addressing 
fraud across the entire economy and 
lacking in specific powers to ensure that 
constituent parts of the economy work 
together to tackle the problem. Despite 
this, it has some good people who are very 
committed to this work, but it doesn’t have 
the proactive focus on the financial cost of 
fraud that is needed. More prosecutions 
don’t necessarily mean that there is 
less fraud, it might mean the opposite. 
The important thing is to generate 
beneficial outcomes not just activity.
In the view of the authors of this Report, 
what is needed is a Public Sector 
Counter Fraud Agency (PSCFA) linked 
to the department which is ultimately 
responsible for public expenditure in the 
UK - the Treasury - and with the defined 
remit, authority and resources to work 
specifically to reduce losses. The work of 
such an agency must be and be seen to 
be a major government priority. A defined 
structure will be needed which allows 
the unit to work effectively with all public 
sector organisations. We do not need to 
centralise all activities but we do need to 
ensure their effective coordination (and 
that will require the PSCFA to have relevant 
powers). Most importantly, such an agency 
must combine responsibility for both 
operational counter fraud work and the 
policy work which is essential to design and 
redesign processes and systems so that 
the opportunities for fraud are minimised.
However, organisational changes 
are only part of what is needed.
How can losses be reduced?
The importance of accurate 
measurement of the problem
Accurate measurement of the nature 
and scale of public sector fraud losses 
is key to this Report and would be 
essential for their reduction. If one 
doesn’t know what the problem is, how 
can the right solution be applied?
It is no longer reasonable to suggest that 
fraud losses cannot be measured. This has 
now been done at least 132 times across the 
world, and is a legal requirement in the U.S.
It is also no longer the case that such work 
costs too much. Efficiency developments 
in recent years mean that, within the levels 
of accuracy and statistical confidence 
described earlier in this Report, loss 
measurement can take place cost-
effectively24, just as it has done in the U.S.
What is needed is a program of accurate 
measurement (and re-measurement to 
gauge progress) of losses across each 
major area of public expenditure.
The importance of public accountability
Openness and transparency about the 
extent of losses is also very important. In 
the U.S. the Improper Payments Information 
Act of 2002 has advanced this process 
considerably. It requires designated major 
U.S. public authorities to estimate the 
annual amount of payments made where 
fraud and error are present and to report 
the estimates to the President, Congress 
and the public together with a progress 
report on actions to reduce them.
The guidance relating to the IPIA states 
“The estimates shall be based on the 
equivalent of a statistical random 
sample with a precision requiring a 
sample of sufficient size to yield an 
estimate with a 90% confidence interval 
of plus or minus 2.5%”. This latter 
guidance is essential, providing for a 
standard approach which gives accurate, 
comparative information and prohibiting 
the ‘measurement’ of losses in such a way 
as to produce pre-designated results.
By virtue of this information being made 
public each year, the extent of public 
accountability for losses is much clearer and 
the resulting public pressure is a powerful 
force for their reduction. The UK needs its 
own Improper Payments Information Act.
20 An example would be the NHS, even 
after several years tackling the problem
21 Procedures to prevent fraud are often 
strongest where high value fraud might 
be perpetrated, whereas a comparable 
investment when the value of an individual 
fraud is smaller is less likely. This is because, 
unless fraud losses are measured, an 
organisation will not know the volume of 
such ‘smaller’ frauds that it is facing.
22 See the NHS Counter Fraud Strategy of 
1998, the National Audit Office’s ‘Good 
Practice in Tackling External Fraud’ Guidance 
of 2004, European Healthcare Fraud and 
Corruption Declaration of 2005 and the 
Government’s Fraud Review Report of 2006
23  The Attorney-General’s Office.
24 Ten years ago a fraud loss measurement 
exercise could involve 6 people working 
full-time for 6 months; it can now be 
undertaken using less than 100 person 
days, or six times more efficiently.
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A comprehensive range of 
action to pre-empt fraud
Institutional change is not enough. The 
UK’s public sector needs a real change 
in its approach to countering fraud. 
The last decade has shown that fraud 
losses are rarely reduced by purely 
‘operational’ work to detect, investigate 
and sanction fraudsters. There is an active 
‘supply line’ of replacement fraudsters 
and always will be. However, what is not 
inevitable is that there will always be the 
weaknesses in processes and systems 
which allow fraud to take place. 
It is also the case that the size of the 
honest majority can be grown and 
they can be mobilised to exert much 
stronger peer group pressure against 
fraud. Fraud is not a victimless crime; it 
deprives the citizens of this country of 
vital public services – and will continue 
to do so unless we urgently tackle it.
Correspondingly, the size of the dishonest 
minority can be shrunk and they can 
be deterred. Deterrence arises from the 
potential fraudsters’ perceptions of the 
extent of public acceptability of the actions 
they are contemplating, the likelihood 
of their being prevented or detected, the 
likelihood of a professional investigation 
uncovering information and evidence about 
what has taken place, the proportionality 
and certainty of the application of sanctions 
and the extent to which losses will be 
recovered. Each of these types of action 
are important in themselves, but even 
more so when publicised and visible.
The Government’s Fraud Review 
accepted this comprehensive approach 
but, sadly, it has faded from view as 
the work of the NFA has proceeded.
What would this cost?
One of the key virtues of the comprehensive 
approach is its cost-effectiveness. Trying to 
simply detect a slightly higher proportion 
of fraud and conduct more investigations 
would be extremely costly, apart from 
being futile, for the reasons outlined above. 
The least costly types of counter fraud 
activity are those which are pre-emptive - 
communications programmes relating to 
culture and deterrence and the design and 
redesign of policy, processes and systems.
The UK’s public sector needs a reorientation 
of its counter fraud work rather than 
a massive new investment, and the 
coordination of these resources to ensure 
much greater synergy and consequent 
impact on losses. However, the PSCFA 
would need to be of a size commensurate 
with its task. What size would this be 
and what cost would be involved?
The nearest example from the specific 
UK context is the NHS, which prior to 
1998 had almost nothing in place to stop 
fraud or prevent losses. Since then, the 
NHS Counter Fraud Service (NHS CFS) has 
provided an example of how losses can 
be reduced – as we have seen above. Its 
funding level for 2008-2009, the year 
on which we have based the statistics in 
this Report, was a mere £10.298 million, 
employing 195 staff. This represents only 
0.0137% of the NHS’s expenditure!
If we apply that percentage to public 
expenditure as a whole it would mean 
the PSCFA would cost in the order of 
£80 million per year. Over the three year 
period during which savings referred to 
in this Report have been calculated, the 
total cost (taking account of reduced 
costs during the set up period) might 
be at  the very most in the order of 
£200 million. The savings which have 
been shown to be possible would be 
over £22 billion – a ratio of 110 : 1.
Such a return on investment highlights 
the attractions of this proposition. 
The real question is not why would 
we do this, but why wouldn’t we?
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“The least costly types of counter fraud activity are those 
which are pre-emptive - communications programmes 
relating to culture and deterrence and the design 
and redesign of policy, processes and systems.”
This Report makes four clear 
recommendations to achieve the 
reductions in losses which are possible:
That the Government should create •	
a new Public Sector Counter Fraud 
Agency linked to the department 
which is ultimately responsible for 
public expenditure in the UK - the 
Treasury - and with the defined 
remit, authority and resources to 
work specifically to reduce losses
That a program of accurate •	
measurement (and re-measurement 
– to gauge progress) of losses 
should be implemented across each 
major area of public expenditure
That the Government should urgently •	
enact a new Improper Payments 
Information Act to mandate the 
annual accurate measurement of 
losses and their public presentation
That a major programme of work •	
should be undertaken to reorientate 
existing public sector counter fraud 
resources to pre-empt fraud losses.
It would be possible to write a Report with 
many more recommendations than those 
which are stated here, however, the view 
of the authors of this Report is that ‘less is 
more’. The detail is for an implementation 
programme. If the UK can take some simple 
clear steps forward then we can achieve the 
significant savings to public expenditure 
which are possible, and prevent 
unnecessary cuts in vital public services.
Why wouldn’t we want to do this?
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Conclusion and recommendations
The financial cost of UK Public Sector Fraud/18
Jim Gee is Director of Counter Fraud 
Services at Maclntyre Hudson LLP and 
Chair of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies
Jim Gee is one of the leading counter fraud 
specialists in the UK. His accomplishments 
include leading the team which cleaned 
up London Borough of Lambeth in the mid 
to late 1990s; advising Right Honourable 
Frank Field M.P. during his periods as Chair 
of the House of Commons Social Security 
Select Committee and Minister for Welfare 
Reform; and being Director-General of the 
European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption 
Network between 2004 and 2006. 
He was also a senior advisor to the 
Attorney-General concerning the 
Government’s Fraud Review which has 
started to professionalise this country’s 
approach to fraud. Gee’s work in the NHS 
reduced fraud-related losses by up to 60 
per cent, delivering financial benefits to 
the tune of more than £800 million and 
achieving a 12:1 return on the costs of the 
work. 
Mark Button is a Reader at University 
of Portsmouth and Director of the 
Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
Mark Button is a Reader in Criminology and 
Associate Head Curriculum at the Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies, University of 
Portsmouth. He has also recently founded 
the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies of 
which he is Director. 
He has written extensively on counter fraud 
and private policing issues, publishing 
many articles, chapters and completing 
four books with one forthcoming: Private 
Security (published by Perpetuity Press and 
co-authored with the Rt. Hon. Bruce George 
MP), Private Policing (published by Willan), 
Security Officers and Policing (Published 
by Ashgate), Doing Security (Published by 
Palgrave), and Understanding Fraud: Issues 
in White Collar Crime (to be published by 
Palgrave in early 2010 and co-authored). He 
is also a Director of the Security Institute, 
and Chairs its Academic Board, and a 
member of the editorial advisory board of 
‘Security Journal’. 
Mark founded the BSc (Hons) in Risk and 
Security Management, the BSc (Hons) in 
Counter Fraud and Criminal Justice Studies 
and the MSc in Counter Fraud and Counter 
Corruption Studies at Portsmouth University 
and is Head of Secretariat of the Counter 
Fraud Professional Accreditation Board 
(CFPAB). Before joining the University 
of Portsmouth he worked as a Research 
Assistant to the Rt. Hon. Bruce George MP 
specialising in policing, security and home 
affairs issues. 
He completed his undergraduate studies 
at the University of Exeter, his Masters at 
the University of Warwick and his Doctorate 
at the London School of Economics. Mark 
is currently working on a research project 
funded by the National Fraud Strategic 
Authority and ACPO looking at victims of 
fraud. 
Graham Brooks is a Course Leader at 
University of Portsmouth
Graham Brooks is Course Leader for the 
Counter Fraud and Corruption MSc. at 
the University of Portsmouth. He was 
previously the Course Leader for the 
Counter Fraud and Criminal Justice Studies 
BA from June 2007 to March 2009, and 
Head of Secretariat for the Counter Fraud 
Professional Accreditation Board from 
September 2007 to March 2009. He is also 
a member of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies at the University of Portsmouth. 
About the Report authors
About MacIntyre Hudson LLP
Established in 1880, MacIntyre Hudson 
is a growing and successful mid tier UK 
independent accountancy firm working with 
entrepreneurial businesses, groups and 
multinationals with operations in the UK.
The firm provides a comprehensive range 
of services and specialist advice, including 
audit and assurance, tax planning and 
compliance for both corporate and individual 
clients, payroll and VAT, corporate recovery, 
business strategy, counter fraud services and 
outsourcing. Other parts of the MacIntyre 
Hudson Group provide specialist advice on 
corporate finance and professional training.
www.macintyrehudson.co.uk
Follow Jim on Twitter http://
twitter.com/MHFraud 
Or email jim.gee@mhllp.co.uk
The Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
The University of Portsmouth’s Centre for 
Counter Fraud Studies (CCFS) was founded 
in June 2009 and is one of the specialist 
research centres in the University’s Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies. It was founded 
to establish better understanding of fraud 
and how to combat it through rigorous 
research. The Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies is home to researchers from a wide 
cross-section of disciplines and provides a 
clear focus for research, knowledge transfer 
and educational provision to the counter 
fraud community. The Centre for Counter 
Fraud Studies makes its independent 
research findings available to support those 
working in counter fraud by providing 
the latest and best information on the 
effectiveness of counter fraud strategies.
www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/
icjs/CentreforCounterFraudStudies/
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To find out more about the people behind 
the name and contact details for our offices 
visit www.macintyrehudson.co.uk 
or email us at info@mhllp.co.uk
MacIntyre Hudson is the trading name of MacIntyre Hudson LLP, a limited liability partnership, registered in England. Registered number: OC312313. Registered office: 
201 Silbury Boulevard, Milton Keynes MK9 1LZ, where a list of Principals’ names is available for inspection. UK member of Morison International with representative 
firms worldwide. Registered to carry on audit work and regulated for a range of investment business activities by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales. Principals acting as administrators or administrative receivers contract as agents and without personal liability. Further information and links to the respective 
regulators can be found via our website www.macintyrehudson.co.uk/information.html Maclntyre Hudson Corporate Finance Ltd is authorised and regulated by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Financial advice is provided in association with Carrwood Maclntyre which is an independent advisory firm and is a trading name of 
LighthouseCarrwood which is an appointed representative of LighthouseXpress Limited which is authorised and regulated by the FSA.
